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1.Introduction
The recent quest for price stability in conjunction with the relative success of the
Bundesbank in maintaining low inflation induced a good number of countries in
Europe and elswhere to reconsider the legal foundations of the institutions that
formulate and implement monetary policy. The notion that Central Bank
Independence (CBI) is an important institutional device for assuring price stability
recently gathered remarkable momentum. Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and
Spain upgraded the legal independence of their central banks. In some other
European countries like the UK and Sweden there is a serious debate about the best
way to reorganize monetary institutions. In parallel there has been a renewed
interest in the old idea of nominal targets. Several factors combined to spur this
interest. First, the breakdown of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the
Maastricht Treaty, that envisages the creation of a highly independent European
Central Bank (ECB) before the end of the century, make the quest for a European
monetary anchor more pressing. Second, as stressed by Goodhart and Vinals
(1994), when they delegate authority to a relatively independent central bank (CB)
politicians' desire to specify its objectives in advance is greater than ifthey retain
authority over monetary policy. Third, the preannouncement of nominal targets
usually has some effect on inflationary expectations, and through them on various
nominal contracts, making it possible to partially capitalize the benefits of credible
monetary policies early on.
Targets help galvanize and coordinate the anti-inflationary forces within the
public sector and outside it around a specific numerical value thus strenghtening the
commitment to price stability. This is achieved not only by commiting the CB but
also by making it more difficult for political authorities to renege on the
commitment to price stability because of the associated detrimental effects ontheir
credibility. This point of view is consistent with empirical evidence showing that,
other things the same, rates of inflation in countries that had nominal targets were
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lower (Cukierman (1992),table 20.4)1. But the credibility of preannounced targets
ultimately depends on their record. Policymakers earn the ability to substantially
impact expectations merely by announcing targets only after they have
demonstrated this ability for a sufficient lenght of time.
During the seventies and the eighties a number of countries such as the US,
Germany, Switzerland and France have preannounced monetary targets ranging from
narrower to wider definitions of money. In the early nineties, several countries like
New-Zealand, Canada, the UK, Sweden and Finland introduced inflation targets.
Exchange rate targets have been, and still are, widely used by many countries.
Under exchange rate targets monetary expansion and interest rate policy are derived
from the objective of maintaining the exchange rate at a fixed peg or within some
prespecified band2.
Altough each type of target alone suffices to provide nominal stability when it is
adhered to, it is not uncommon to observe countries with multiple targets.
Examples are the Bundesbank that has an explicit monetary target and an implicit
inflation target (von Hagen (1995)). Since the early nineties Israel has both an
inflation target as well as an exchange rate target (Bufman, Leiderman and Sokoler
(1995)). The common aim of all these arrangements is to provide a nominal
anchor” for monetary policy by subjugating it to the achievement of a preannounced
target. In practice targets had often been missed but this does not mean that
policymakers made no effort to achieve them or that they were useless. A list of
industrial countries currently using each type of target appears in table 3 of
1The inflation record of New-Zealand under the 1989 new CB law is also consistent
with this view.
2A fixed peg can be viewed as a limiting case of exchange rate bands in which the
width of the band tends to zero. A discussion of the choice of exchange rate bands within
the context of the tradeoff between credibility and flexibility appears in Cukierman, Kiguel
and Leiderman (1994).
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Goodhart and Vinals (1994)3.
There are substantial variations in the identity of the institution making the
announcement of target and in its firmness' across countries. Exchange rate targets
are usually decided upon and announced by government with or without the
participation of the CB. The CB appears to be involved relatively more often in the
case of inflation targets but their preannouncement is often made jointly with
government. But even when government sets targets alone the CB is involved in
their implementation. The relative involvment of the CB in both determining and
announcing the target is greatest in the case of monetary targets but there are
variations even across the countries that had or have monetary targets. The
firmness of the announcement varies from a mere forecast, as is the case in Japan,
to an explicit commitment to use policy in order to correct deviations from the
announced course as is currently the case in New-Zealand. The decision about the
numerical value of the target and the identity of the institution announcing it also
varies substantially across countries. Thus, the highly independent Bundesbank
decides and announces explicitmonetary targets without any direct involvment of
Government. On the other hand the, relatively dependent, Bank of England has
recently been usinginflation targets that are basically set by the Treasury and
announced jointly by the Governor of the Bank and the Chancellor of the
Exchequer. There also is a fair amount of variety within each type of targeting
method. Exchange rate targets vary with respect to band width and with respect to
the slope of the band. In practically all European countries that had or have an
exchange rate target the band (or the peg) is horizontal. Israel and Chile are using
3A discussion of the recent experience with inflation targets appears in Leiderman and
Svensson (1995). GNP targeting is occasionally mentionned as a fourth possible targeting
method, particularly in the US. But as far as I know it remains in the realm of academic
discussions. One of the practical difficulties with this targeting method is that GNP cannot
be targeted on a monthly (or finer) basis since data on it is usually quarterly and becomes
available with a relatively long lag. On the other hand McCallum (1995a) argues that,
given the current state of knowledge about the relative impact of money growth on prices
and output it is more practical to target nominal GNP than inflation. This conclusion is
based on simulations of alternative policy rules for the US and Japan.
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diagonal bands. In the first country the slope of the band is preannounced for a
year in advance. In the second it is adjusted each month as a function of domestic
and of foreign inflation. Monetary targets may obviously focus on alternative
nominal stocks ranging from the monetary base to wide monetary or credit
aggregates. The status of inflation targets also varies across countries with regard to
the target's legal and institutional support, the commitment to and priority of the
target, how explicit the target is, and whether it is decided by the CB, the
government or both. (Further details appear in Leiderman and Svensson (1995)).
Section 2 opens with a characterization of the features of a good target and
discusses alternative targeting procedures in light of this benchmark. Section 3 goes
into a more detailed comparison of inflation targets and of monetary targets. The
identity of the announcing institution and the lenght of the targeting horizon are
discused in section 4. Section 5 briefly reviews conventional wisdom and recent
results concerning the difference between inflation targets and price level targets.
Section 6 discusses several aspects of targetry in the presence of stabilization policy:
targets as a substitute for an optimal CB contract, factors affecting the information
content of inflation targets and the issue of whether there is or there is no credibility
bonus in the presence of stabilization policy. The desirability and design of targets
for the ECB are discussed in section 7. This is followed by concluding remarks.
2. What is a good Target?
A basic question underlying any normative discussion of targetry is what are the
properties of a good target? The ideal target should probably be easy to control,
highly visible (or transparent) to the public, highly correlated with the final
objective, observable at short intervals and should not interfere with the achievement
of other economic goals. In this paper I will take the main final objective of
monetary policy to be the maintainance of price stability4. Provided there are
4Price stability may be taken literally to mean that monetary policy is geared to main-
tain a constant average price level or to mean that it is aimed at maintaining a low rate of
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sufficient exchange rate reserves or if monetary policy is subordinated to its
achievement an exchange rate target satisfies the first condition. As stressed by
Melitz (1988) and Bruno (1993) it is also highly visible and observable on a daily
basis. In small open economies the exchange rate is also strongly correlated with
the price level.
The main drawback of an exchange rate target is that it may lead, in some cases,
to an overvaluation of the currency and to a consequent loss of competitiveness.
This is particularly likely to be the case in small, relatively open economies, whose
domestic financial assets are not perfect substitutes for financial assets that are
denominated in foreign currency. In such economies it is possible to raise the
money supply while maintaining a fixed peg, at least for a while, by means of
sterilized interventions5. In those cases policymakers are tempted to use monetary
expansion to achieve domestic objectives while relying on sterilized interventions to
maintain their commitment to the peg. This combination of policies eventually
leads to a nominal devaluation. But until this happens the real exchange rate may
be overvalued. This problem is unlikely to affect countries like Germany and the
UK whose monies are key currencies and whose financial assets are therefore
highly substitutable. But it may lead to serious temptations to expand the money
supply, in spite of the fixed peg, in countries like Greece and Italy whose monies
are not key currencies and whose financial assets are therefore only imperfectly
substitutable into financial assets that are denominated in other currencies. Part of
this lack of substitutability is due to implicit, if not explicit, exchange controls.
Base targeting has the important advantage that it is, at least in principle, fully
controllable by the CB. But it is less visible than either an exchange rate target or
an inflation target. Hence its effect on inflationary expectations may be restricted to
individuals who have sufficient familiarity with financial and monetary matters.
inflation. The implications of this distinction are discussed in section 5 below.
5A precise description of the mechanics of this process appears in the theoretical part
of Cukierman, Rodriguez and Webb (1996).
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Controllability is likely to be smaller the wider the monetary stock that is being
targeted. Even if it is not available on a daily basis data on the monetary base or on
a wider monetary stock can be obtained, at least by the CB, with reasonably high
frequency. Base, or more generally nominal stock, targeting does not create
temptations to engage in non sustainable policies, as is the case with an exchange
rate peg. But it may interfere with stabilization policy. The main problem with
nominal stock targeting is that it is imperfectly correlated with the price level and
inflation. This is the old Friedmanian problem of long and variable lags between
money and prices. Due to financial innovations and the globalization of financial
markets this problem has recently become particularly severe.
Being focussed on the main final objective of monetary policy inflation targets
have an important visibility advantage over monetary targets since inflation and the
price level are widely understood concepts. In most countries data on inflation is
available at one month intervals which is likely to be sufficient as long as the rate of
inflation is moderate. Since money is neutral in the long run an inflation target
need not interfere with the achievement of other objectives in the long run. But,
due to variable lags between money and prices as well as to shocks to the real
economy, the CB does not have perfect control over inflation. Thus the choice
between inflation and base, or wider nominal stock, targets involves a tradeoff
between visibility and controllability. A discussion of the implications of this
tadeoff appears in section 3 below.
2.1 Positive Aspects of Targets' Choice
I briefly turn now to positive aspects of the choice between alternative targeting
procedures. In particular why do some countries use one target and other use a
different one and why does the choice of target sometimes change over time?
Exchange rate pegs are usually used in small, relatively open economies. Such
countries often peg to the currency of a major trading partner provided this currency
is relatively stable. Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands that peg to the Mark are
examples. Fixed pegs are also used during and following the stabilization of
inflation when credibility is relatively low. But after a while there is a tendency to
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flexibilize the exchange rate (Cukierman, Kiguel and Leiderman (1996)). Argentina,
Mexico, Israel and Chile are examples. A possible theoretical explanation for why
policymakers with low credibility prefer fixed pegs to inflation targets cum flexible
rates is proposed by Herrendorf (1995). The argument is that since the exchange
rate is more visible and more controllable than the rate of inflation, policymakers
find it more costly to deviate from an exchange rate target than from an inflation
rate target.. As a result the disciplinary effect of an exchange rate target is stronger
making it easier for serious policymakers with little reputation to signal their
commitment to price stability.
Countries that have opted for either monetary or inflation targets are usually not
so open. They often have flexible exchange rates or at least relatively more flexible
rates and are more likely to have relatively wide financial markets. The US, Japan,
Germany, and the UK are examples. Further details can be found in Goodhart and
Vinals (1994) and in Cukierman, Rodriguez and Webb (1996).
3. Inflation Versus Monetary Targets
Financial innovations and the consequent breakdown of traditional regularities
between money and nominal income reduced the ability of monetary authorities to
control inflation and with it the meaning of monetary targets for short run inflation
control. This led to the recent adoption of inflation targets in Canada, New-Zealand,
the UK, Sweden, Italy, Finland and Israel.
Despite success in attaining preannounced targets in New-Zealand, Canada and
the UK, bond yields suggest that long term inflationary expectations persistently
exceeded long term targets throughout the first years after the introduction of
inflation targets (Ammer and Freeman (1994)). This does not necessarily imply that
the preannouncement of targets had no impact on expectations. But it does imply
that in the presence of imperfect reputation this impact is partial and that high
reputation for price stability is established only after a persistent record of low
inflation. This is consistent with theory which implies that in the presence of
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imperfect reputation the impact of announcements on inflationary expectations is
partial (Cukierman and Liviatan (1991) and chapter 16 of Cukierman (1992)).
As noted in the previous section the choice between inflation targets and
monetary targets involves a tradeoff between visibility and controllability. This
tradeoff is most notable when the monetary target is high powered money since this
is a nominal stock that can be tightly controlled by the CB. What is the differential
effect of those two targeting methods on expectations and on the expected value of
policy objectives? Cukierman (1995a) provides a systematic analysis of these
questions in a framework of private information about the dependability of
policymaker. A dependable policymaker always tries to achieve preannounced
targets whereas a non dependable policymaker always chooses the policy that
maximizes the value of objectives after the public has commited itself to nominal
wage and interest rate contracts. Under base targeting dependable policymakers can
demonstrate their dependability relatively quickly. Since the base is perfectly
controllable any deviation from the preannounced path is immediatly recognizable as
due to lack of dependability. By contrast, since the controllability of inflation is
imperfect it is more difficult for the public to quickly separate between dependable
and non dependable policymakers.
Thus, a dependable central banker can establish his dependability relatively more
quickly under base targeting than under inflation targeting provided thesame
number of individuals pay attention to both types of announcements. On the other
hand, since inflation targets are more visible to the general public than base targets,
less people pay attention to the latter target making the immediate impact of base
announcements on theaverage inflationary expectation of the public smaller. The
analysis reveals that inflation targets dominate base targets when reputation is high
and policymakers are sufficiently patient.
Not surprisingly the relative advantage of base targets increases with their visibility,
and under some conditions, the lower is the controllability of inflation. Altough
these results are exploratory they back up the presumption that the recent higher
uncertainty about the relation between money and prices increases the relative
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attractiveness of nominal stock targets.
Beyond that, inflation targets have the virtue of being focussed on the final
objective of interest. This is particularly important when the relation between
money and prices is relatively unstable. But inflation targets make it easier to exert
expansionary pressures on the CB in order to (temporarily) reduce interest rates and
achieve various real objectives. Such pressures are particularly likely to materialize
in periods in which the inflation target is attained6. This problem is compounded
by the fact that when there is a change in the rate of inflation neither the public, nor
policymakers know with certainty whether the change is persistent or transitory.
Data on the rate of inflation is usually monthly. When the monthly rate of inflation
goes down there is an immediate tendency to proclame victory over inflation and to
release the monetary brakes in order to reduce interest rates and achieve related real
objectives. But when the monthly rate of inflation goes up there is a tendency to
wait and see whether the change is really persistent before applying the monetary
brakes. This asymmetric response of policy compounds the inflationary bias of
monetary policy. In the absence of the persistent-transitory confusion the bias is
likely to be smaller since, with full certainty about the persistence of shocks, it is
harder for advocates of expansionary monetary policy to press their case.
4. Who Should Announce Targets and for How Long?
4.1 Who Should Announce?
The credibility of announced targets depends among other things on the identity
of the institution emmiting those announcements and on its position within the
narrow circle of policymakers that make decisions about monetary policy. In
general announcements by a representative ofall the policymakers involved is likely
to carry more weight than announcements by a subgroup. To the extent that only
one institution announces targets it is preferable that the announcing institution be
the one that has the highest degree of control over the target under consideration.
6Further discussion of these issues appears in Cukierman (1995b).
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Thus if there is a monetary target and the CB has full authority over monetary
policy the CB should make the announcement. If the Treasury has authority over
monetary policy the announcement should be made by the Treasury. When
authority over the announced target is shared a joint announcement would appear to
be particularly important. For example, if there is an exchange rate target in place
and government as well as the CB can affect it, the announcement should be made
jointly by both institutions.
4.2 What is the Optimal Targeting Horizon ?
When they make announcements and subsequently renege on them dependable
policymakers normally incur costs7. The ideal targeting strategy for a dependable
policymaker is, therefore, to announce a conditional targeting procedure that
specifies all the contingencies under which the target will be abandonned.
Unfortunately such a strategy is usually impractical for several reasons. First,due to
Knightian uncertainty it is hard if not impossible to formulate all possible
contingencies in advance. Even if that was possible it is likely that most of the
public would not pay attention or would not comprehend a targeting procedure that
required more than a certain minimal threshold level of complexity. Finally, some
of the contingencies are revealed expost only to a select group of policymakers
making the degree of adherence to the target unverifiable by most of the public even
on an expost basis. It appears therefore that targeting procedures will have to
remain simple implying that even a dependable policymaker will sometimes renege
on the announced target.
The necessity to specify simple targets implies that in general there is a tradeoff
between the flexibility needed to use monetary policy for stabilization purposes and
the discipline needed to eliminate the (suboptimal) inflationary bias of monetary
7The nature of those costs is discussed in Cukierman (1992) page 312.
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policy8. One way to strike an optimal compromise between those two objectives is
to commit to the attainment of the targeton average over several periods.
Garfinkel and Oh (1993) show that, in the presence of private information, the
optimal targeting period is usually longer than one period but not infinite. They
also identify some of the factors that determine the lenght of the optimal targeting
period.
The idea of multiperiods targets has recently been applied in the context of
inflation targets. Examples are Spain and New-Zealand. A potential problem with
multiperiods inflation targets is that they increase the temptations of policymakers to
rebase. In particular when actual inflation deviates upward from the target there is a
temptation to forget' the deviation and to stick to the target only from the next
period and on. Since there is no similar temptation when there is a downward
deviation from the target this creates a positive inflation drift'. A similar base
drift' occured in the US during the period of monetary targeting.
Uncertainty about the future usually increases with the lenght of the planning
horizon. This implies that the likelihood that a dependable policymaker will have to
renege on a simple targeting procedure increases with the lenght of the prespecified
targeting period. One way to reduce the likelihood of reneging is to limit the lenght
of the targeting period. The presence of substantial uncertainties tends, therefore, to
reduce the optimal lenght of the period over which the announced target is in effect.
5. Price Level Versus Inflation Targets
An issue that got some recent attention is whether one should aim at a pricelevel
target or at aninflation rate target. Had inflation been perfectly controllable this
two targeting methods would be equivalent provided the inflation target is set at
zero. But since inflation and the price level are not perfectly controllable the target
is usually missed. The difference between the two methods arises because the
8An intuitive discussion of the reasons for such a bias can be found in chapter 2 of
Cukierman (1992).
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correction of misses' differs. In the first case a period of higher than normal
inflation would have to be followed by a period of deflation. In the second case
there is no need to undo past misses. Under an inflation target, if actual inflation in
the last period is higher than the target, there is no attempt to compensate for that in
the current period. Thus, with an inflation target uncertainty about the long run
price level is larger but there is more certainty about the future rate of inflation than
with a price level target.
In the presence of nominal rigidities higher inflation variability is associated with
higher output variability. It follows that under a price level target there is less
uncertainty about the price level but more uncertainty about output than under an
inflation target (Duguay (1994), Fischer (1994)). Conventional wisdom implies
therefore that the choice between this two targeting methods involves a tradeoff
between price level uncertainty on one hand and output and inflation uncertainty on
the other.
But Svensson (1995b) shows that when the loss function of policymakers is
quadratic in unemployment and inflation the tradeoff arises only when the degree of
persistence of unemployment is zero or sufficiently low. When, on the other hand,
unemployment persistence is sufficiently high price level targets dominate inflation
targets on all counts. In particular price level targets deliver lower inflation and
output uncertainty, lower price level uncertainty, and also eliminate the inflationary
bias of monetary policy. This result obtains provided it is possible to assign' by
law or by some other device the appropriate' (quadratic) objective function to the
CB. Thus, with sufficient persistence in unemployment, and assigned quadratic loss
functions price level targeting is preferable to inflation targeting.
6. Inflation Targets and Stabilization Policy
6.1 Inflation Targets as an Optimal Contract for Central Bankers
It is well known that in the presence of employment or other real objectives on
the part of monetary authorities discretionary policy leads to a suboptimal
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inflationary bias. In an influencial paper Rogoff (1985) noted that the bias can be
reduced by appointing a conservative' central banker that cares more than society
about price stability. Here the degree of conservativeness refers to the relative
weight given to price stability in the objective function of the central banker. But,
since he cares relatively less about employment, the conservative central banker also
engages too little in stabilization policy relatively to what is optimal from a social
point of view. There is, therefore, a tradeoff between reduction of the inflationary
bias and stabilization policy--or in short-- a tradeoff between credibility and
flexibility.
Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) show that it is possible to devise
an optimal incentive contract for central bankers that eliminates the bias without
sacrificing the ability to stabilize output. This is achieved by imposing an
appropriate incentive schedule on the CB. A nice feature of this type of incentive
contract is that it achieves the social optimum independently of whether or not
government and the bank share the same objective function and the same
information9. The optimal contract is thus strongly reminiscent of recent
implementations of inflation targeting methods in New-Zealand, Canada, and several
other countries.
The optimal contract approach to the design of monetary institutions is a natural
theoretical vehicle for the formalization of the wider idea of accountability.
However, there are several issues that have to be addressed before such optimal
contracts can be implemented in practice. The first and main difficulty is that,
altough they perform a useful function as benchmarks, social planners do not exist
in practice. Hence government has to be relied upon to impose the optimal
incentive schedule on the CB expost. Is it realistic to assume that government can
be relied upon to do that? I believe that in the abscence of additional safeguards the
answer is no. Governments and legislatures are also subject to an inflationary bias
9For the simple Barro Gordon (1983) framework the parameters of the optimal contract
are not state contingent. But this is not likely to be the case in more realistic environments
(Persson and Tabellini (1993), Walsh (1995b)).
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and usually to a greater extent than the CB. The constant threats to Federal
Reserve independence mounted by Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative Henry
Gonzales, among others, in order to press for lower interest rates attest to that.
Similar mechanisms operate in other countries as well. McCallum (1995b) and
Walsh (1995b) himself recognize that if government cannot commit to the optimal
penalty schedulebefore various types of nominal contracts are concluded the
optimal CB contract will not be credible10. This then shifts the focus to the
question of how to commit government to implement the contract expost. This is
largely an open question. But it is likely that the presence of legislation which
requires government to publicly explain its actions whenever it deviates from the
expost implementation of the contract may at least partially commit government to
the expost application of the contract. A requirement of this type that requires
government to go public when it overrides the CB appears in the recent Bank of
New-Zealand legislation. Another practical difficulty is that the design of an
optimal contract requires advance knowledge of the preferences of the central
banker to be appointed. This is hardly likely to be the case in practice as illustrated
by the work of Havrilesky (1991).
One of the advantages of delegation of authority a la Rogoff is that it is not
necessary to rely on the political principals for the implementation of the optimal
contract expost. But,as we saw, Rogoff's proposal has the drawback that it does not
achieve the optimal level of welfare11.
Svensson (1995a) has recently shown (for quadratic loss functions and transitory
real shocks) that when the objective function of the central banker differs from that
of society with respect to desired inflation (rather than with respect to the relative,
10Even the experts responsible for the Roll Report (1993) in the UK came down in
favor of having the CB set its own targets, largely on the ground of the potential time
inconsistency of politicians (Goodhart and Vinals (1994)). See also Cukierman (1994b)
p.1444.
11Here the optimal level is defined as the level of welfare achieved by a benevolent
social planner with full commitment ability.
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multiplicative, preference for price stability as in Rogoff) delegation of authority to
a central banker with the right' desired inflation target achieves the same result as
the optimal contract. This implies that the socially optimal level of welfare can be
achieved through delegation of authority to a central banker with a suitable desired
level of inflation rather than via an incentive contract for the bank. The big
advantage of the first institution is that it does not have to rely on the expost
implementation of the optimal contract by inflation bias ridden governments. It
would appear, therefore, that Svensson's result implies that it is possible to reach the
social optimum simply by delegating authority to an appropriately chosen type of
central banker. A practical difficulty, that may prevent the implementation of such
an institution, is that the political principals may not be able to identify exante the
desired levels of inflation of potential candidates for the CB. Svensson suggests
that this problem may be circumvented by giving the Bank only instrument
independence, but not goal independence, so that the target or desired' rate of
inflation in the Bank's loss function is mandated by government. But under such
circumstances government may, again, be tempted not to impose this institutional
goal on the Bank expost.
6.2 The Information Content of Inflation Targets in the Presence of
Stabilization Policy
Under imperfect control the preannouncement of targets almost always reduces
the public's uncertainty about inflation (Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) or Chapter
14 of Cukierman (1992)). But when the CB has the discretion to engage in
stabilization policy, the information content of inflation targets differs depending on
the parameters of the economy and of the objective function of policymakers. In
particular, other things the same, the information content of unbiased announcements
is higher the larger is the discount factor of policymakers. The intuitive reason is
that more patient policymakers are less activists. As a consequence monetary policy
responds less to shocks, making it easier for the CB to forecast future money growth
and inflation. Hence inflation announcements are more meaningfull and have a
stronger impact on expectations when policymakers are more patient. This point is
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demonstrated in the appendix within the framework of a variant of the model in
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b). An important practical implication of this result is
that monetary institutions that are more conducive to a long run policy outlook--
like longer terms for high officials of the CB--also raise the information content
and therefore the credibility of inflation announcements12.
6.3 Is There a Credibility Bonus?
It is sometimes claimed that when relatively credible central banks engage in
stabilization policy they loose less credibility than banks that possess a lower level
of reputation. Thus, goes the argument, a highly credible CB like the Bundesbank
can deviate for a while from the objective of low inflation with little effect on its
reputation as an inflation fighter. But if the Banca d'Italia decides to play the same
game, the negative impact on its reputation is larger. This point of view implies
that good reputation not only reduces the inflationary bias but also makes it easier to
engage in stabilization policy. Altough this argument seems plausible, and may
very well be true under some circumstances, the little available empirical evidence
does not support it13. As far as I know there is also no precise formulation of the
conditions under which it might be true. It is therefore best viewed, at this stage, as
an intriguing possibility. My conjecture is that when the matter is investigated more
toroughly it will turn out that a crucial element in this argument is the speed of
learning by the public. When monetary institutions are conducive to a slow speed
of learning credibility is destroyed (and built up) slowly. When, on the other hand,
they are conducive to a fast speed of learning credibility is more sensitive to recent
events and can be destroyed (but also rebuilt) more quickly. The work of
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986a) implies that in the absence of announced targets the
speed of learning depends on several parameters like the slope of the short run
12See also section 4 in Cukierman (1994a).
13Empirical evidence on the relation between CBI and fluctuations in output appears in
Alesina and Summers (1993) and in Cukierman et. al. (1993). Debelle and Fischer (1994)
compare the sacrifice ratio in the US and Germany and find that it is higher in the second
country. See also Alesina and Gatti (1995).
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Phillips curve, the political discount factor of policymakers, the variability in the
relative emphasis of policy on alternative objectives and the degree of control over
the money supply and inflation (a compact and precise statement of the directions of
influence appears as proposition 10.1 in Cukierman (1992)).
In the presence of announced targets, like in the model in the appendix, it is also
possible to identify determinants of the credibility ofinflation targets. Two
different concepts of credibility suggest themselves--average credibility and marginal
credibility of announced inflation targets. The first concept is a measure of the
average difference between the announcement and the public's expectations after
being exposed to the announcement. The second concept focusses on the impact of
a one unit change in the announced target on expectations. It is thus a measure of
the impact of targets on expectations. A fuller discussion appears in Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986b) and in chapter 14 of Cukierman (1992) ( proposition 14.4 is
particularly relevant in this context)14.
7. What Target for the ECB?
Altough it contains a substantial number of provisions concerning the ECB, the
Treaty of Maastricht does not mention targets for the Bank. The issue of targetry
for the ECB is therefore open from both a legal as well as from a practical point of
view. This raises two questions. Should the ECB announce targets ? If the answer
to the first question is positive what kind of targets should be used by the Bank ? I
believe the answer to the first question is affirmative for two reasons. First,
provided the institutional and other devices that enhance the credibility of the Bank
as an inflation fighter are in place, the announcement of targets makes it possible to
14As emphasized in chapter 11 of Cukierman (1992) credibility is a concept with many
meanings and interpretations. Along those lines it should be emphasized that the two
concepts of credibility in the text differ from the popular notion that labels a CB as being
credible if it is conservative in Rogoff's sense.
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reduce inflationary expectations early on15. Second, targets help coordinate and
galvanize the anti inflationary forces within the public sector. The associated
publicity makes it relatively difficult for expansionary politicians to ignore the
targets thus reducing actual inflation as well.
As to the second question it appears that for a big block of countries like the
EEC pegging the exchange rate to another key currency is undesirable as well as
politically impractical. By elimination this leaves either monetary targets or
inflation targets as possible candidates. As explained in section 3 the first type of
target is more controllable but the second one is more visible. Other things the
same, the higher visibility of inflation targets makes the political cost of reneging on
them higher than the cost of reneging on monetary targets. Hence the range of
contingencies for wich inflation targets are respected is wider than the range of
contingencies for which monetary targets are respected. Financial innovations and
related changes in the relationship between money and prices also make inflation
targets preferable. But, relatively to monetary targets, inflation targets make it
easier to exert expansionary pressures on the Bank in order to reduce interest rates
and to achieve various real objectives.
It would appear therefore that a two prongs approach that combines the
advantages of both inflation and of monetary targets is advisable16 Such a
combination target requires the specification of rules for situations in which the two
targets conflict. Along those lines one way to reduce the relatively stronger bias of
inflation targets is to adhere to monetary targets when actual inflation is below or at
the target value and to set policy so as to achieve the inflation target when actual
inflation is above target.
15A detailed discussion of conditions that are conducive to a credible ECB appears in
Cukierman (1995b).
16 Lamfalussy (this volume) argues that, within Europe, the practical difference be-
tween countries currently using inflation targets and those using monetary targets is not as
fundamental as would appear to be the case at first blush. If this view is correct a combi-
nation of the two targets should be relatively easy to “sell” to a majority of countries in
the monetary union.
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Unlike most existing central banks the ECB will face several fiscal authorities.
Under such circumstances the incentive to inflate rises with the number of countries
in the union if the Bank is not shielded from pressures to, directly or indirectly,
finance national deficits. Being aware of those dangers the drafters of the
Maastricht Treaty endowed the Bank with a high degree of legal independence and
prespecified the distribution of seignorage across countries. Given the existence of
those safeguards, the strong emphasis of the Treaty on price stability and the
fractionalized interests of the national fiscal authorities, the ECB should have a
substantial impact on the determination and announcement of targets. In other
words, as far as the numerical value of targets is concerned, the Bank should have
partial goal independence as well asinstrument independence17. In addition,
endorsement of these targets by the national fiscal authorities is desirable since it
would enhance their credibility.
7.1 What targets for the transition period?
As emphasized by Leiderman and Svensson (1995) the initial phase of monetary
union is likely to be characterized by substantial uncertainties. As a consequence,
during the transition to monetary union, the credibility of the ECB is likely to be
rather vulnerable. It is therefore advisable to deploy additional temporary credibility
enhancing devices during the initial phase of EMU. In view of this a possibility
that ought to be given serious consideration is atemporary peg of the new
European currency to another stable key currency or currencies. An important
advantage of a peg is that it reduces price level uncertainty in the face of large
uncertainties about money demand.
Another option to consider for the transition period is totemporarily assign the
conduct of European monetary affairs immediately after the formation of the
monetary union to the Bundesbank. Such a strategy would, obviously, have to be
accompanied by the specification of a time table and of concrete steps for the
extension of authority over monetary policy, after some initial phase of
17This distinction is due to Debelle and Fischer (1994).
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experimentation, to other members of the union. The advantage of such an
arrangement is that it reduces uncertainties at the time they are likely to be the
largest - that is at the Union's inception. It's main drawback may be lack of
political feasibility due to national pride and the fear that such an arrangement may
evolve into apermanent hegemony of Germany over European monetary policy..
8. Concluding Remarks
Experience, empirical evidence and theoretical considerations all support the view
that targets perform useful functions. They reduce inflationary expectations and the
associated upward drift in nominal contracts. They also may reduce actual inflation
by making it more difficult to ignore long term price stability in order to achieve
short run real gains.
But, in the long run, targets are only as good as the general commitment of
policymakers to price stability. This commitment and the informativeness of
targets depend in turn on more fundamental parameters like the rate of time
preference of policymakers as has been illustrated in section 6.2 and in the
appendix. But the point is more general. The beneficial impact of targets
ultimately depends on the emphasis given to price stability. This depends, in turn,
on the structure of the economy, the structure of monetary institutions, the political
system and on the interaction among those factors18.
18International evidence on the effect of gross political influence on price stability
appears in Cukierman and Webb (1995).
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Appendix
A1 The Information Content of Unbiased Inflation Announcements or Forecasts
Consider a policymaker whose objective is to maximize the expected value of
(A-1)
subject to a short run Phillips relation
(A-2)
Here N, N* and Nn are the actual, the desired and the natural levels of
employment.π and πe are the actual and the expected rates of inflation andβ is a
politically determined discount factor. xi can be thought of as a shifting parameter
that characterizes the importance attached by policymakers to employment
objectives and therefore to stabilization policy. A large x means that the desire of
policymakers to engage in stabilization policy is stronger. A large x may reflect
the policymaker's private forecast that employment will be on the low side making
him more eager to stimulate employment. The objective function has the form in
(A-1) only for N*-Ni >0
19. x is a persistent stochastic variable whose distribution
is given by
A is the mean, publicly known, value of x . p is the stochastic part of x and is the
(A-3)
19For N*-Ni < 0 the loss due to the deviation of actual from desired employment is
zero. Part 1 of the appendix to chapter 9 of the appendix to Cukierman (1992) presents
conditions under which the probability that N*<Ni tends to zero.
22
private information of policymakers. The persistence of real shocks and therefore of
the desire to engage in stabilization policy is captured by specifying p as a first
order Markoff process. The innovation, v, is normally distributed. The relation
between the rate of growth of the relevant nominal stock and inflation is stochastic
and is given by
where χi is a (normally distributed) white noise process with zero mean and(A-4)
variance σψ2 that characterizes the extent to which inflation is uncontrollable by
policymakers. ψ may be due to shocks to monetary velocity or to other unforseen
one time shocks to the price level. v andψ are statistically independent.
Policymakers have perfect control over the relevant (for inflation) nominal stock and
also know what this stock is, while the public does not know what it is. This
assumption captures in a simple way the realistic presumption that the CB has better
information about what is the nominal stock that is most relevant for the price level
than the public20.
Consider now inflation targets. Legislation or some other commitment device
assure that in each period the policymaker--perhaps the CB-- makes an unbiased
(given his information) inflation announcement for the period. Expectations are
rational in the sense that the public utilizes all the information it has, including the
inflation announcement, to produce an optimal forecast of the upcoming inflation
and concludes nominal contracts on this basis. In each period the timing of events
is as follows. First the value of p from the previous period is revealed to the CB.
Using this information the CB produces anunbiased inflation forecast for the
period and announces it as the inflation target (πa) for the period. The public takes
notice of the annouced target, forms its inflation expectation and concludes nominal
contracts accordingly. The current innovation, vi, to the policymaker's objectives
realizes next and is revealed to him before he picks the rate of monetary growth for
20For a fuller discussion of this issue see page 111 in Cukierman and Sokoler (1993).
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the period21. Finally the uncontrollable shock to inflation,ψi, realizes and together
with the choice of money growth determines the actual rate of inflation.
With this timing, the CB can engage in meaningfull stabilization policy since v
realizesafter the conclusion of nominal contracts. Furthermore, in spite of the fact
that the CB makes abona fida effort to produce an unbiased inflation forecast,
taking future stabilization efforts into consideration, the announced inflation target is
a noisy indicator of subsequent inflation. This reflects the CB uncertainty about the
upcoming innovation to its own objectives as well as about the shock,ψi, to
inflation. Except for the fact that, when it makes the announcement, the CB is still
uncertain about thecurrent value of objectives this framework is identical to the
framework in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) or in chapter 14 of Cukierman
(1992). The best forecast, by the CB, of upcoming inflation at announcement stage






21Note that knowledge of the current innovation to objectives is equivalent to
knowledge of the current state of objectives since the previous state of objectives is
already known to policymakers from the beginning of the period.
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This model maps into the one in chapter 14 of Cukierman (1992) withσ γ2 from
(A-6)
that model replaced by the right hand side of equation (A-6) and withδ given by
equation (14.6b) of that chapter. Note that B characterizes the degree of policy
activism since it measures the response of money growth to the changing stochastic
part of objectives22. Using figure 14.1 in the chapter to perform a comparative
static experiment with respect to the discount factor,β, it can be shown that B is a
decreasing function ofβ implying that activism is lower when policymakers are
more patient.
Equation (A5) above implies that when the activism parameter B is higher
announced inflation targets are noisier indicators of future inflation (σγ2 is higher).
In conjunction with proposition 14.1 in Cukierman (1992) this implies that
preannounced inflation targets are more informative when policymakers are more
patient.
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